Freedom. by Hook, Sidney
Zhc ©pen Court
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea
Founded by Edwakd C. Hegelee
Vol. XLI (No. 2) February, 1927 (No. 849)
CONTENTS
Frontispiece. Indian Dream Journey to Spirit World.
Freedom. Sidney Hook 65
A Singular, Inadequate Conception of Philosophy. Victor S. Yarros 74
American Indian Compositions Reflecting the Social and Political Organization
of the Tribes. George H. Daugherty, Jr 80
Deterministic Presupposition of Psycho-Analysis. Theodore Schroeder... 90
Joel Chandler Harris, Interpreter of the Negro Soul. J. V. Nash 103
What is Religion f Fletcher Harper Swift Ill
The Soul of Art. Hardin T. McClelland 115
Book Reviews 125
Zhc ©pen Court publisbing Company
Wieboldt Hall. 337 East Chicago Ave., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Per copy, 20 cents (1 shilling). Yearly. $2.00 ("in the U.P.U.. 9s. 6d.)
Entered as Second-Class Matter March 26, 1887, at the Post Office at Chicago, 111., under Act of March 3, 1879
Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Company, 1927.
Cornell Studies in
Philosophy
Published Under the General Editorial Supervision
of the Professors in the Sage School of
Philosophy in Cornell University
RECENT NUMBERS
No, 12. Some Modern Conceptions of Natural Law. By
Marie T. Collins, A.M., Ph.D.—pp. vi, 103 $1.00 net
No. 13. The Ethical and Economic Theories of Adam Smith.
B Glenn R. Morrow, A.M., Ph.D.—pp. vi, 92 1.00 net
No. 14. The Philosophical Bases of Asceticism in the Pla-
tonic Writings and in Pre-Platonic Tradition. By
Irl Goldwin Whitchurch, A.M., Ph.D.—pp. 108.. . . 1.00 net
No. 15. The Logic of Contemporary English Realism. By
Raymond P. Hawes, A.B., Ph.D.—pp. 147 1.25 net
No. 16. The Philosophy of Emile Boutroux as Representa-
tive of French Idealism in the Nineteenth Century.
By Lucy Shepard Crawford, A.B., Ph.D.
—
pp. viii,
154 1.25 net
No. 17. The Philosophical Presuppositions of Mathematical
Logic. By Harold R. Smart, A.M., Ph.D.
—
pp. v,
98 1.00 net
LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.
55 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK
\ \,
V
o
The Open Court
A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.
Vol. XLI (No. 2) February, 1927 (No. 849)
Copyright by The Open Court Publishing Company, 1927
FREEDOM
BY SIDNEY HOOK
OF FREEDOM, one can say what St. Augustine said of time.
"If no one asks me what it is. I know : if I wish to explain it to
one that asketh, I know not." [Confessions Book XI. XIV). Yet
if we kcnow how freedom is attained we are content that we know
something of what it is. Fie who refuses to make a quest until he has
a bullet proof definition in hand from which he can deduce the object
of his quest can never proceed far, for either he is pretending to dis-
cover what he knows already or else raises problems of how what
is both novel and valid can be inferred without looical sleight-of-hand
from wdiat is familiar. But it is the method and manner of the dis-
cussion rather than its matter which lead to confusion in philosophy.
The deepest source of this confusion can be traced to a tendency to
convert the distinctions and differences we find in subject matter into
separations, then to pose the question of how these separations can be
brought together and end by hopelessly confounding the situation in
an attempt to deduce one from the other. And yet our understanding
of natural and social events overtly expressed in our empirical
practices is not beset Avith the difficulties that oftimes attend our
explanation of them. Despite Hegel we never really deduce categor-
ies from one another. We discover mind in an order of things and
bodies, and yet we know that minds are not bodies, colors in a series
of vibrations and yet colors are not vibrations, lines in points and
points in lines and yet lines are not points, thoughts in an order of
words and yet words are not thoughts, and so on. The world with
its latencies and possibilities is given once and for all time and in its
growth and movement there are revealed dififerent dimensions and
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aspects which are incommensurable and therefore irreducible. One
bom blind does not know what red or green is merely because he
knows its vibration number. He may become a physicist but he can
never paint a landscape. These dimensions, stripping the word of
its spatial sense, are not created by consciousness but are objective
discoveries, like the play of light and color upon a mountain peak,
a temple or a scaffold, all of which have distinct organizations in
stone and straw of their own. When it is said that the world is
given once and for all time—a phrase of Alach's which has provoked
bitter criticism—the statement is not intended as a proposition m
logic, but as a presupposition of natural human behavior. It is true
that a great many things have been discovered from suppositions
and hypothesis of what the world is not, but these conceptions like
guesses on a more homely plane, transfer and attribute the characters
of the world discovered to segments and regions of the world to be
explored.
These observations stated baldly may be accepted as so many
commonplaces until it is understood to what use we intend to put
them. For following their lead we say that freedom is a fact dis-
covered in knowledge of an order of necessity or mechanism ; or
that man wins or finds freedom in a world in which he is confronted
by necessity. Such a statement seems to outrage the sensibilities of
the tender minded who unwarrantably conclude that an equation has
been drawn between two conceptions commonly taken to be contra-
dictory and who feel that there is something logically and ethically
suspicious in locating human freedom in a mechanical order obvious-
ly indifferent to human hopes and desires. Then without further
excuse we are assailed with a great deal of talk about the zanll being
free, about psychic indeterminism and mental teleology.
Now the so-called 'problem' of freedom, as T understand it, is
not primarily an inquiry for psychology but an inquiry for ethics. It
is not a question of whether the mil is free but whether the mind is
free, or in other words, it is a question of whether man and man's acts
in terms of which we read his mind, are free. It is very difficult to un-
derstand the view which holds that man's freedom begins where
natural law ends, that the realm of freedom is outside the realm of
physical necessitv and law. Tf that were the case such freedom would
be utterly unintellieihle. For i^nnsider, what would freedom mean
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in a world where there is no uniformity, measure or ordered se-
quence—-what could the free will or free mind or free man effect or
accomplish if the objects and things through which that freedom ex-
pressed itself had no intrinsic order in virtue of which they could be
transformed, used or enjoyed? In the absence of mechanics how
would what is called 'free will' differ from the fevered fancies of the
delirious or the extravagant conceits of the insane? As an empiri-
cal fact it can be shown that when the mind or will—no matter wdiose
—expresses its choice it does not intend to open the floodgates to
gay disorders and chaos but intends rather to introduce additional
order—to significantly determine and stabalize the flow of things so
that its power might be potentialized for future use and appreciation.
Nor is the rejoinder that the will is free to choose between the
necessity of one order and the necessity of another any more intelli-
gible. First, it flies in the face of modern science which shows not
only that the will can be directly controlled by suggestion but that
together with our emotional life it is functionally dependent upon a
certain physiological state of glands, nerves, toxins, etc. Second,
if it be held that a man's acts are independent of the facts of heredity,
free from motive, free from environment, free from character,—it
follows that his acts must be frse from his very self—for all of these
factors define the self. Tie who denies this inference is committed to
the view that the self is a spook or ghost lodged somewhere in the
back of the brain playing hide and seek with the scientist's scalpel.
Aristotle knew better. But at any rate the utter divorce between
character and free acts gives rise to a host of absurdities and con-
fuses the theory of responsibility and punishment in whose interest it
was elaborated and defended. For if nothing about 'X' is the cause
of his act how can he be said to be the author of it? Those who
believe that because every volition or act can be tied down to a unique-
ly determined movement of brain molecules man is thereby deprived
of his freedom might just as well say that a man is a slave because he
undergoes an operation in order to save his life or preserve his health
and that the only time he can freely submit to the surgeon's knife is
when there is no reason in the world whv he should be operated on
at all. So much for the psychology of the matter entered into to re-
move certain preliminary misconceptions.
"Where then does freedom come in?" interject those who believe
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that the discovery of structures or invariant law in nature closes the
question with an emphatic negative. The answer is simple. Just be-
cause I have clear purposes and can realize them I say that freedom
is a fact^—a fact in social life and experience—discovered wherever
knowledge of natural and emotional necessities is present. When
ever there is a confusion of purposes, whenever we do not know
what we want or do not know what we mean, we are unfree. This
seems to be a somewhat cavalier and paradoxical solution of the
problem for I am saying that just because a man's purposes, aspira-
tions, acts or will, if you please, are meddled and inconsistent
—
just
because they are not unambiguou=;ly determined man is unfree. This
is not or should not be news in the realm of mind. Aristotle in Book
III of his Nicomachcan Ethics has enumerated in another connection
the limitations which a man is free from when he is said to be free
at all. They are (1) the physical compulsion of some external force
and (2) ignorance of the circumstances in which an act is performed.
Insofar as the first may possibly be affected by power or control
which follows upon knowledge, it merges into the second.
Knowledge, then, of ourselves and of the world without is the
key to freedom for it tells us what we are and that we can be no
other than what we are. Freedom is the consequence of this know-
ledge revealed and attested to by our everyday activities. A musical
virtuoso is free to play only when he has acquired a mastery of the
instrument and its technique ; a mechanic or artisan is free in action
and in thought only when he is sufficiently familiar with the organi-
zation of his machines and the character of his problem and mater-
ials to make application effective. Self-knowledge is in so far forth
freedom because he who clearly understands himself is not hampered
by irresolution, doubt or indecision for like Socrates in Santayana's
Dialogues in Limbo he "knows his own mind, and thoroughly dis-
cerns what he means and what he loves." He who knows not his
own mind, the sources of his ideals and the direction in which they
seek fulfillment is wasted by a torturing fever of desire, a restless
fretting and striving for a past that can never be recalled and a fu-
ture that can never be realized. "He who talks of freedom and
excludes thought," says Hegel, "knows not what he says."
Freedom of mind implies an acceptance—an acceptance of what
knowledge reveals concerning the necessary order of things. Thitj
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acceptance is not the resignation of one who baffled and bewildered
in a world too complex for his wits represses his instincts and de-
sires in a severe asceticism ; it is not the acceptance of the camel or
the Christian who take their burden kneeling; but it is an acceptance
that is at the same time an affirmation—an affirmation not of the
world's goodness but of the w^orld's necessity an affirmation which
leaves the mind sane, unperturbed by illusion and anguish. When
the utter inexorableness of law comes home to one, revolt cannot stir
the heart, desire for the impossible burns itself out into cold ash. We
do not fume and fuss because we have no eyes in the back of our
head and we do not hold meetings of protest against the summer's
heat and the winter's cold. Only he who accepts the rainstorm is free
to go about in it with an umbrella.
It is sometimes thought that if all of life's activities are deter-
mined by the movement of 'atoms in the void' then every counsel of
wisdom is vain and every increase in knowledge is superfluous, avail-
ing little to influence the course of events. This clearly does not fol-
low. ]\Iy health at any moment is completely determined by the
state of my body and yet the knowledge of medicine may enable me
to develop a stronger and healthier body. We may be so built that
emotions of one sort or another continually afifect the mind. But by
understanding the mechanism which conditions the disturbance we
may cause a particular emotion to be displaced by another by submit-
ting ourselves to an external stimulus which sets up within us a
stronger reaction. By substituting one stimulus for another we suc-
ceed in making emotions yield to others in modifying their par-
ticular expressions. Pugnacity for instance, can never be argued or
beaten out of a man. But the situation may be so presented as to
make it give way to stronger emotions of pity or love. As a form of
emotional disturbance pugnacity is neither good nor bad, but be-
comes such as its definite expressions afifect interests and desires.
Knowledge of how these irrepressible pugnacious tendencies operate
may lead us to find dififerent fields for them to assert themselves and
suggest different ends to set before them. Its operation, however, is
none the less chemically determined whether we find it good or bad.
Knowledge enables us to rule our passions by guiding them not by
suppressing them. A great deal of the psychology of sublimation
taken as a rational therapeutic and not as a psychoanolytic myth is
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contained in Parts 3-5 of Spinoza's Ethics. But, as we shall see, be-
cause all of our acts and emotions are determined it does not mean
that they are predestined or fated. Of course the difference between
a free act and an act that is not free does not necessarily lie in a dif-
ference between the kinds of action performed. A wise man and a
fool may vote the same ticket or go to the same church. Some have
therefore argued that since every choice is a value judgment, ex-
istence being neutral to all values, every chooser is equally free in the
realm in which that choosing goes on. If this is what is meant by
freedom, one may very well grant it and stop to ask what important
distinction is clarified besides that of fact and value. To close the
question here is surely to overlook the tremendous difference which
judgments of fact or the possession of knowledge make in their mani-
fold effects upon the judgments of value.
Freedom, then, like personality, virtue, honor and most other
things worth having, is not a natural endowment but a conventional
or ethical acquisition—something won through knowledge and
analysis. If ^ve may reverse the traditional interpretation of the
Bible story we should say that Adam in his ignorance and innocence
could not have performed a free moral act in eating of the tree of
knowledge of good and evil. Only after having partaken of the fruit
and acquired knowledge can Adam in any significant sense be said to
have become free—as free as his Creator for whom the possession
of knowledge is the sceptre and writ of divinity and hence of free-
dom. "And the Lord God said, 'Behold, the man is become as one o*"
us, to know good and evil."
At this point those who fear that every use of the word freedom
conceals a hidden theology interpose with a final and 'crushing" ob-
jection. Granted, they say, that so-called freedom is knowledge ot
the union of the temper and pulse of our life with the nature of
things is it not true that that knowledge itself is determined by the
movement of 'atoms in the void' and therefore is no more an express-
ion of freedom than ignorance and error which are also the result of
matter in motion ? It is foolish to respond that knowledge of the de-
pendence of knowledge upon some kind of molecular change is free-
dom for it is promptly pointed out that knowledge of such depend
encc is itself conditioned by a brain state. And so the game of
shuttlecock and battledore so popular in contemporary discussion of
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the problem^ is on. It can only proceed because of the fruitless and
self-defeating practice of calling one another's subject matter into
question instead of following an empirical lead. In one case a cer-
tain physiological state or configuration of atoms is called into ques-
tion by being reduced to terms of structure instead of being examined
in respect to purport. A picture may be defined in terms of pigments
and oils but it is not thereby understood. Perception of the condi-
tions of knowledge is not perception of its meaning.
Therefore to those who affirm in the discussion of freedom that
knowledge itself is determined by certain physical characters and
chemical secretions we say, "Quite true but you are shifting the issue
and calling subject matter into question by investigating the antece-
dents of knowledge instead of its consequences. And in the conse-
quences of knowledge lies freedom." Knowledge of ourselves and
of nature—of its fixities and uncertainties, enables us to control and
predict. \\Tiere we can control and guide and renounce—even if it
be no more than putting on a new face before necessitv, there i'; free
dom found. When joy is consequent upon the complete understand-
ing of necessity then freedom is intensified. Once knowledge is pres-
ent and the impossibility or imcertaintv of volition or choice between
any two alternatives is not to be attributed to a freedom of indiflPer-
ence, better called paralysis, of will and impulse but either to physi-
cal constraint or to the objective indeterminateness of the situation,
as when we say "We do not kno^c what to do," or "We can not do
what we know should be done." As knowledge gives out the rational
will falters and becomes free again only as we act on the presumptive
probabilities of knowledge relations w^hich hold of the past.
This is not denving that the antecedents of knowledge are the
conditions of freedom. It is maintaining, however, to return to the
areument of the openino- paragraph, that freedom is not its condi-
tions anv more than color is its xibrations. Tt mav verv well be that
knowledge mav not be comnletelv attainable because of some physi-
cal or phvsiological lack or defect, yet striving for it will develop to
the full those potentialities for knowledge within us. Reaching rock
bottom we say that he w^hose 'bodily complexion' makes impossible
the attainment of knowledge is not free and can never become free.
He is enslaved by nature.
We can put this another Avay and gladden the hearts of those
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who pride themselves on their scientific bias. A life of iiuman free-
dom is one determined by knowledge ; a life of human bondage is one
not so determined. But it must be borne in mind that we have not de-
stroyed the distinction although we have made it more difficult to
understand, for the significance shifts from the word 'determined'
which is the same in both cases, to the different phrases which quali-
fy it. Whenever we limit ourselves to fundamental description—
and this is our business as metaphysicians—no explanation can wipe
out distinctions in subject matter discovered as a matter of fact.
Although human freedom depends upon a natural order, the
natural order does not determine or confer upon itself significance.
That is to say, the values which arise in the possession and exercise
of freedom can never be derived from the order of the domain m
which that freedom is a fact. He who sees the whole of things may
idly watch its play as a spectator, may participate with zest in its
movement as an actor, or may with the power of a divine play-
wright pull down the curtain upon the living. For the free man there
is no cosmic compulsion to live or die, to be a saint or a scoundrel,
to pray or to scoff. But in whatever he will do he will be true to his
own nature. For him the compulsion follows after a basic choice
but follows from the consequences of the choice in an ordered world.
If he chooses to live in Fociety then the compulsion arises from the
nature of society. But the foresight of the free man marks out and
accepts these compulsions as conditions so that although their full
force is felt they do not chafe or sting. Unless as life is dear to us
there is nothing to prevent us from taking fire as a patch of sunlight
or as a raiment of many colors. And when we embrace illusions and
hug our dreams to our lieart we know that we do so only on nature's
suffrance hedged in and confined by its laws and humors.
Tt was said above that the human freedom we have discovered
is in no sense a fatalism. The means which a free man selects or
adopts to realize his aims and ends follow from his character, from
his workinf^ materials and environment. But from the viewpoint o?
fntnlism—whether it be the non^lnr or classical conceotion. no matter
what a man's character is, no matter what he does or how much or
how little he knows, the end to which he is predestined will be ful-
filled, 'will-he nill-he'. Fatalism involves the same negation ot an
order in nature and in man as does radical indeterminism.
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Freedom as a way of life finally is not unrelated to the meta-
physics of nature. If the whole of existence is an absolute mechan-
ism, completely and irreversibly ordered, then conplete and absolute
freedom is within human reach for freedom becomes a direct
function of understanding and insight into nature and human nature.
However in a world which seems to present a cross grained pattern of
law and chance, freedom although more precious is more difficult to
attain. Unpredictable leaps and jumps in nature set at nought cal-
culations based upon the assumption of unbroken continuous law.
Says Santayana "... the most visionary of mystics . . . knows how
invisibly fiy the shafts of Apollo : let but the lightest of them cut the
knot of the heart, and suddenly there is an end of eloquence and
policy and mighty determination. He knows that it suffices for the
wind to change and all the fleets of thought will forget their errand
and sail for another haven."
Therefore in an open universe, spiced with chance and alive with
possibilities, a life of human freedom is not only an organized enter-
prise, it is a spirited adventure as well.
